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Abstract 
Child care subsidies play an important role in stabilizing parental employment 
and helping low-income families access quality and affordable child care options. 
However, low-income families on average only maintain subsidies for short periods of 
time, commonly known as spells. While there are several reasons a family may stop using 
subsidies, some policymakers and researchers have expressed concerns that program 
policies may create barriers to subsidy maintenance. With limited federal requirements 
under the Child Care and Development Block Grant, states have developed divergent 
policies for their state-based child care subsidy programs. To date, research on child care 
subsidies has mainly focused on the demographics differences between subsidy recipients 
and low-income families who do not use subsidies. Very little is known about the effects 
of states’ policies on whether families’ maintain subsidy coverage. 
Using data from the Urban Institute’s CCDF Policies Database and the 
Administration for Children and Families’ CCDF Administrative Dataset this paper 
analyzes the effects of polices on average spell length and stability of child care spells 
from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2010. In particular, the study focuses on policies 
related to whether families can count job search as an eligibility activity, the length of 
time between when a family must redetermine its eligibility, and requirements around 
reporting changes in income. To calculate the effect of policies on subsidy receipt, a 
difference-in-difference model was run using fixed state and time effects.  
All three policies had significant effects on average length and stability of spells, 
although to varying degrees. Policies that did not require families to report all changes in 
income were associated with longer and more stable child care spells. An initial analysis 
of job search eligibility found that states that did not allow job search were associated 
with increases in spell length and stability of spells. However, further analyses that 
focused on both TANF recipients and the share of eligible children with stable spells 
found that more restrictive policies around job search were in fact associated with a 
decrease in average spell length and stability. This could mean that states with more 
restrictive policies may be serving more stable populations and a measure only looking at 
observed spells will not capture the effect on less stable families likely effected by the 
policies. Finally, redetermination policies had mixed effects on average length and 
stability of spells, with longer redetermination periods resulting in increases in both 
stable and unstable spells. Shorter eligibility periods may create barriers for some 
families, while allowing others to take care of unresolved issues that may prevent them 
from maintaining subsidies. 
In developing policies, states face the dual challenge of meeting the needs of low-
income families while ensuring subsidies are provided at appropriate levels. Studies such 
as this may offer states the opportunity to identify policies that create most significant 
barriers to subsidy maintenance and consider how changes to policies may better meet 
the needs of low-income families.   
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Introduction 
Child care subsidies play an important role in improving low-income families’ 
access to affordable and quality child care. Child care expenditures are estimated to 
account for as much as 30 percent of a low-income family’s total income (Laughlin, 
2013, p. 15). A lack of affordable child care can be a significant barrier for low-income 
families as they try to negotiate work and find quality supervision for their children.  
Limited options can create instability in parental employment and may also lead parents 
to place children in low-quality child care arrangements or to leave children unattended, 
which may have negative effects on child development.  
Because of the importance of quality child care in stabilizing parental 
employment and in improving developmental outcomes of children, the federal and state 
governments subsidize child care through a number of systems, including the tax code 
and direct programs, such as Head Start and public pre-kindergarten. The largest subsidy 
for low-income families comes in the form of child care vouchers1 through the Child 
Care and Development Fund (CCDF). 
However, only a small proportion of eligible families utilize subsidies, and those 
who do often use them for only short periods of time, commonly known as “spells.” 
Researchers estimate that only 15 to 30 percent of eligible families receive subsidies 
(Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2010, 2012; Herbst & Tekin, 2013). 
Additionally, studies have found that the average spell typically lasts from three to seven 
months (Adams & Rohacek, 2010; Meyers et al., 2002).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Some states also administer subsidies through contracts with providers. In FFY 2011, approximately 8 
percent of subsidies nationwide were paid through contracts (Office of Child Care, 2011).  
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Disruptions in child care subsidy receipt can lead to instability in child care and 
create financial challenges for families as they shift resources to cover child care costs. 
Continuity of child care is associated with better developmental outcomes as the child is 
able to form secure attachments with his or her caregiver and benefit from social 
interactions with a stable peer group (Adams, Snyder, & Sandfort, 2002b; Ha, Magnuson, 
& Ybarra, 2012). With instability in child care, parents may also struggle to maintain 
employment as they juggle child care arrangements. As a result, instability in child care 
can have negative two-generational implications for low-income families: job stability 
and financial security of parents and the household and the development of their children 
(Adams & Rohacek, 2010; Meyers et al., 2002). 
Parents may opt not to use child care subsidies for a variety of reasons, including 
access to child care alternatives, such as Head Start and publicly-funded preschool 
(Johnson, Martin, & Brooks-Gunn, 2011); lack of knowledge about eligibility (Shlay, 
Weinraub, Harmon, & Tran, 2004); or a preference to not use child care. Families may 
also face temporary periods of ineligibility because household income is too high or a 
parent has lost a qualifying activity, such as a job. However, some policymakers have 
expressed concerns that certain program policies, which vary by state, may make it 
difficult for parents who need financial assistance to access and maintain child care 
subsidies. 
To date, very little is known about how specific policies may impact a family’s 
decision or ability to maintain coverage. Interviews with administrators and recipients 
suggest that states’ policies can significantly affect a parent’s decision to interact with the 
subsidy system (Adams et al., 2002b). Certain policies can also impose significant 
 4 
burdens on families, making it too difficult or costly (often in the form of time) to 
maintain coverage. For example, some states require families to report all changes in 
household income, while other states only require reporting changes over a certain 
amount or do not require families to report changes until their eligibility is renewed. 
More frequently required interactions with a subsidy agency may pose a barrier to parents 
with inflexible work hours and may reduce the value of the subsidy for families.   
This paper investigates the relationship between subsidy policies and families’ 
maintenance of subsidies. In particular it addresses the following question:  What%is%the%
effect%of%states’%child%care%subsidy%policies%on%the%stability%of%subsidy%usage%for%low7
income%families? 
 
Child Care Development Fund: One block grant but fifty different programs 
With 1996 welfare reform and new parental work requirements, the need for 
affordable child care became increasingly important for low-income families, particularly 
single mothers. In addition to overhauling the country’s welfare program, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) combined four 
federal child care subsidy programs into the Child Care and Development Block Grant 
(CCDBG). The main goals of CCDBG are to support parents’ work efforts while 
improving the ability of low-income families to access quality childcare.  
Under the block grant, states have greater flexibility in designing and 
implementing their subsidy programs than they had been given under the pre-PRWORA 
programs. Federal regulations are limited and only stipulate that states cover children 
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under the age of 132 and that parents need to be working or engaged in work-related 
activities. Additionally, states cannot use funds to cover families with income above 85 
percent of the State’s Median Income (SMI) and must reimburse providers at the 75th 
percentile of the state’s market rate for child care. With limited federal regulations, states 
have developed vastly different program policies, including how they define work-related 
activities, the co-payments families must pay, how much providers are reimbursed, and 
the process for applying and redetermining eligibility.  
States face the dual challenge of meeting the needs of low-income families and 
developing policies that guarantee that services are authorized at appropriate levels. Since 
the federal government can hold states financially accountable for coverage that is 
inconsistent with the federal or individual state governments’ eligibility and authorization 
policies, states must develop policies that help minimize the incidences of improper 
payments. Some states have developed policies that restrict eligibility and require 
families to interact with the subsidy agency more often, while other states have sought to 
redefine eligibility parameters, such as expanding what is considered work-related 
activities (Adams, Snyder, & Banghart, 2008).  
Previous research has mainly focused on why so few families utilize child care 
subsidies and the differences that exist between subsidy recipients and those who are 
eligible but do not receive subsidies (Shlay et al., 2004). Studies show that compared to 
eligible non-recipients, recipients of child care subsidies generally have higher income 
levels, are more proficient in English (Johnson et al., 2011), and live in female-headed 
households (Herbst, 2008). Families with children aged 0-5 are also more likely to utilize 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 States can set the age limit higher for children with special needs.  
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subsidies, compared to those with children aged 6-12 (Herbst, 2008). Studies have also 
found that many families still remain eligible for the subsidy program as their spells end, 
suggesting that other factors may impact parents’ decision to leave the program (Grobe, 
Weber, & Davis, 2008; Ha et al., 2012; Ha & Meyer, 2010). 
This study examines the impact of three specific program policies on stability of 
subsidy receipt amongst low-income families: whether families can count job search 
towards the work eligibility requirements; the length of time a family can receive a 
subsidy before undergoing the re-eligibility process, commonly known as the 
redetermination period; and under what circumstances families need to report changes in 
their incomes. 
Since child care subsidy eligibility is tied to a parent’s work efforts and income, 
families may face lapses in subsidy receipt because of temporary changes in employment 
or income, which are common amongst low-income workers (Adams et al., 2008; 
Adams, Snyder, & Sandfort, 2002a; Ha et al., 2012). Some states allow parents to 
participate in job search as a work-related activity, often for a limited period of time. This 
may help parents to focus on the job search process and increase the likelihood that they 
find a job (Adams et al., 2002a).  
The frequency of eligibility redetermination varies significantly across states, 
typically ranging from 6 to 12 months, and can impact a family’s decision to maintain 
subsidy coverage. The redetermination process itself may prove burdensome, particularly 
for parents who are unable to take time off from work, and families may opt to let their 
eligibility expire (Adams et al., 2008; Ha et al., 2012). Studies have found that more 
frequent redeterminations are associated with shorter child care spells (Meyers et al., 
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2002) and that families often leave the program the month following their 
redetermination period. Grobe et al (2012) found that more than half of their study 
population’s program exits coincided with a required redetermination. After controlling 
for other factors related to a family’s decision to exit, their study found that parents in 
their last month of eligibility prior to redetermination were 2.6 times more likely to exit 
the program than those not in their redetermination periods. Families that exited in this 
study continued to use other assistance programs, suggesting that they may still be 
income-eligible for the child care subsidy program and they are willing to receive 
government assistance (Grobe et al., 2008).  
In addition to redetermination, most states require families to report changes in 
circumstances that may impact eligibility, copayment levels, and number of hours 
authorized for care. States vary significantly in the types of changes that parents may 
need to report, including work schedule, income, employment, household composition, 
and residency. Low-income families, in particular, can face frequent changes in their 
lives and, as a result of reporting policies, may find themselves interacting with the 
subsidy agency frequently in order to maintain eligibility (Adams et al., 2008; Adams et 
al., 2002b). What parents must do to report changes varies across states, but could include 
additional documentation requirements and applications, office visits, and even 
undergoing recertification. 
Research on how policies may impact subsidy usage has been limited. What 
research has been conducted has mainly focused on the effects of policies on families 
within one or a handful of states. As a result, findings have been limited in their 
generalizability. Up until recently, it has been difficult to analyze policies across states. 
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However, the recent introduction of the Urban Institute’s CCDF Policies Database 
(Giannarelli, Minton, & Durham, 2013) in 2011 provides researchers the opportunity to 
examine child care policies across time and all states. The current study leverages this 
new database to better understand the relationship between states’ policies and how long 
families maintain subsidy coverage.  
  
Methodology*and*Data*Analysis*
As noted above, policymakers and researchers have expressed concerns that some 
policies choices may create barriers for families in their efforts to maintain child 
subsidies, which may lead to shorter subsidy spells, and therefore to unstable family 
income and disruptions in child care arrangements. Based on my research, I hypothesize 
that:  
• When families are allowed to count job search towards their eligibility 
requirements, they will have longer and more stable subsidy spells. Low-income 
populations can face significant job turnover and long periods of unemployment. 
As a result of strict eligibility requirements that obligate families to work, families 
may face more frequent turnovers in their subsidy spells.  
 
• When families have longer redetermination periods, they will have longer and 
more stable spells of subsidy receipt. More frequent interaction with child care 
subsidy agencies may create barriers for families as they navigate the challenges 
of having to take unpaid time off from work and find reliable transportation.  
 
• Families that face less restrictive requirements around reporting changes in 
income will have longer and more stable subsidy spells. Some states may require 
families to report all changes in income to the child care agency, which can result 
in long wait times on the phone with caseworkers or taking time off from work to 
go to the agency and complete additional paperwork. (The study assumes that 
most parents are compliant with the regulations and that non-compliance in 
evenly distributed across states and time.)  
 
• Finally, states that have more restrictive policies may serve more stable 
populations. More restrictive policies, such as requiring families to report all 
changes in income or to undergo redetermination every 6 months, may be 
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particularly burdensome to families that have more tumultuous lives and less 
resources. As a result, states that have these policies in place may be serving more 
stables families that are likely to have longer subsidy spells.  
 
Data Sources 
To test these hypothesizes, I constructed a dataset across a four-year period 
(October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2010) using data on subsidy policies from The Urban 
Institute’s CCDF Policies Data (Giannarelli et al., 2013) and child- and family-level data 
from the Administration for Children and Families’ (ACF) CCDF Administrative Dataset 
(Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, & 
Administration on Children, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). Policy data were matched to child 
and family observations by state and date (month/year).  
The CCDF Policies database tracks changes in state-level policies across more 
than 550 policy variables, including eligibility and reporting requirements and 
redetermination procedures. Data are coded based on states’ caseworker manuals and 
child care regulations. The policy start and end date indicates the time frame that a policy 
is in place.  
The CCDF administrative data set is a compilation of monthly case-level data that 
states and territories are required to report to the ACF’s Child Care Bureau. States have 
the option of submitting data for the entire case population or a sample of the population 
that has been collected through approved sampling guidelines. States that submit a 
sample must submit at least 1,200 sample families each year.  For states that submit full 
data sets, the Research Connection selects a random sample of families in proportion to 
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the monthly caseload.3  The dataset contains both household- and child-level data and 
documents household composition, reasons for receiving care, start date of the child care 
subsidy, family copayment, household income, ethnicity, type of provider, number of 
hours authorized, and subsidy reimbursement to providers. 
 
Missing and Duplicative Data 
The original administrative dataset had more than one million observations. 
However, 143,427 observations were dropped because observations were duplicative, 
were representative of territories, were missing data on key variables, or were outliers. 
Because of programmatic differences and population size, territories were excluded from 
the analysis. For a full discussion of missing and dropped data, see Appendix A. 
Additionally, for policy variables, data were not available for every state during the study 
period of interest. (See Appendix B for a listing for the start date of each of the policies.)  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The dataset indicates whether the dataset was originally submitted as a full population data or as a sample. 
For territories, all children and families are reported. The lowest caseload sample is 200 families in a 
month. 
Table 1. Variables 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables Control Variables 
• Average length of subsidy 
spells (months) 
• Share of observed families 
with stable spell (i.e., spells 
greater than 12 months)  
• Share of observed families 
with unstable spells (i.e., 
spells less than 6 months) 
• Share of eligible children 
with stable spells (i.e., spells 
greater than 12 months) 
• Job search eligibility (i.e., 
for new and continuing 
recipients; only for 
continuing recipients; not 
allowed, parents must have a 
job)  
• Redetermination period 
(length of time in between 
when families are determined 
eligible and have to 
redetermine eligibility)  
• Reporting requirements 
around income (i.e., report 
all changes; report changes 
more than a certain amount; 
no requirements around 
changes in income) 
• Child’s age (defined as a 
range) 
• Household monthly income 
• TANF receipt 
• Single parent-headed 
households 
• Household size 
• State 
• Month 
• Year  
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As a result, those months were not included in the analysis.  
 
Dependent Variables  
I developed three dependent variables to measure subsidy receipt: average length 
of subsidy spells and two categorical variables of unstable spell length or stable spell 
length. For this analysis, a child care spell is defined as the number of months of child 
care subsidy receipt prior to a three-month lapse in the subsidy. In the administrative 
data, the start date of families’ subsidy receipt is restarted after a 90-day lapse in subsidy. 
It’s important to note that most of the literature defines a spell as the number of months 
prior to a one-month lapse in receipt (Grobe et al., 2008, p. 149; Ha & Meyer, 2010, p. 
349; Meyers et al., 2002, p. 6). Increasing the lapse in receipt from one month to 90 days 
may not capture short-term churning of subsidy use and may underestimate the impact of 
the policies on care maintenance for the population as a whole.  However, long-term 
lapses in childcare subsidy pose the greatest threat to stability of child care usage and 
parental employment.  
Because the administrative dataset does not allow researchers to track families 
over time, the analysis focuses on the impact of policies on average spell lengths within a 
given month, and not the length of individual children’s spell lengths (as would be 
measured after the spell had ended).  Average spell length in a given month was 
calculated as the difference between the start of the child’s spell and the month the data 
were reported. When data were collapsed to the state and month level (as described 
below), this measure became an average spell length for all children in the state during 
the given month and subgroup. To calculate the second dependent variable, children were 
coded as having stable, long-term coverage if they had received the subsidy for more than 
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12 months. When collapsed to the state and month level, this variable became the share 
of families receiving subsidies with stable spells. A similar method was used to calculate 
share of families with unstable spells. Children were considered to have short-term, 
unstable spells if they had received the subsidy for less than six months.  
Families in the study population had an average spell length of 25.0 months. Spell 
lengths were not normally distributed. (See Chart 1.) More than 40 percent of all spell 
lengths had lasted less than 10 months when observed. Approximately 53 percent of the 
subsidy-receiving population was considered to have a stable spell in the given month, 
while about 23 percent of the population was classified as having an unstable spell.  
Finally, to test the hypothesis that states with more restrictive policies serve more 
stable households, I calculated the share of children eligible for the subsidy program that 
had spells longer than 12 months. To determine the number of children eligible for the 
subsidy, I used data from the American Community Surveys (ACS) (Ruggles et al., 2010) 
to estimate the number of households with children in each state for a given year (2006-
2010) with income below 85 percent of the state’s median income (based on household 
size). It’s important to note that 85 percent of median income is a federal limit and most 
states set their income eligibility thresholds below this threshold. The number children 
eligible was determined by multiplying the number of eligible households by the average 
number of children per eligible households in a given year and state. Finally, a dependent 
variable was calculated as a ratio of the number of children with stable spells in a given 
month and state to the number of eligible children in a given year and state.  According to 
my estimates, approximately 2.9 percent of eligible children received the subsidy in a 
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given month and on average 1.4 percent of eligible children had spells longer than 12 
months.  
 
Independent Variables 
The analysis focuses on the impact of three specific policy variables: eligibility 
based on job search, reporting requirements related to changes in income, and the length 
of the redetermination period. For job search eligibility, some states allow job search to 
count as a work eligibility activity, either for families who already receive the subsidy 
(known as continuing eligibility) or for all subsidy recipients. Other states do not allow 
job search to count as a work-related activity and require at least one parent to be 
employed. For the redetermination period, the analysis looks at the length of time 
between when a child is declared eligible and when the child must redetermine his or her 
eligibility.  Finally, the policy variable related to changes in income documents whether a 
state requires a family to report all changes in income, only changes over a certain 
amount, or no changes in income. A couple of states also have unique policies that are 
categorized as “Other” in the analysis. Observations were coded with the state’s policy 
for the given month.  
For all three variables, there is variation across states and within states over time. 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of policies by state and month. The three policies are in 
place in each state, but vary in how the combination of policies. For example, according 
to the first cell in the table, there was 292 state and month combinations that had the 
following policies in place: allowed job search for all, required families to undergo re-
eligibility after six months, and required families to report all changes in income. As can 
be seen, most states across the study had policies in place that required families to report 
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all changes in income. Policies related to job search eligibility and redetermination period 
are more mixed, but most states allowed for job search to count as an eligibility activity 
and had 6-month redetermination periods in place. (See Appendix C for a summary of 
states’ policies and to see how policies changed during the study period.)  
 
Age Group and subsidy length.  
The average age of a child in the dataset was 58.7 months, or just about 5 years of 
age, and the average spell length was 25.0 months. Subsidy usage can vary significantly 
based on a child’s age, particularly in the early years when parents may have different 
preferences for child care and cost of care can be significantly higher for infants and 
toddlers. As a result, the analysis breaks subsidy receipt into five distinct groups: : 0-23 
months (infants)4; 24-35 months (2-year-olds); 36-47 months (3-year-olds); 48-59 months 
(4-year-olds), and children older than 60 months (five years or older). Subsidy usage for  
the oldest group is particularly challenging given that other factors can compound care 
usage, such as schooling; access to alternative child care resources, such as Head Start 
and public pre-kindergarten; and differences in parental employment as a result of a 
child’s age. As can be seen in Table 4, average spell length ranged from 14.7 months for 
infants to 33.0 months for children five years or older. The analysis controls for child age. 
 
TANF recipients and Single Parent Households  
The impact of policies on the recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) remains an important area of focus for subsidy policies, given the close !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The infant category can be particularly challenging. A 5-month-old child, who has been in care for most 
of his or her life, will be categorized as having short-term care because technically he or she cannot be in 
care for more than 5 months. 
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ties that the CCDBG program has to welfare reform and the vulnerability of this 
population because of increasing restrictions in the TANF program. Since 1996 the 
percentage of child care subsidy recipients who also receive TANF has rapidly declined, 
mainly due to declines in TANF caseloads. During the study period, only 18.1 percent of 
subsidy recipients received TANF. In addition to controlling for TANF receipt in the 
main analysis, a subgroup analysis was run to determine if the policies impact TANF 
recipients differently. 
 Single-parent households are the main recipients of child care subsidies, making 
up approximately 90 percent of subsidy recipients. Because of the nature of single parent 
households, these families may have different child care needs than two-parent 
households. The main analysis controls for single-parent households.5  
 
Model Overview 
 The child-level observations were collapsed to the state and month level by age 
groups, single-parent households, and TANF receipt. As a result, the three dependent 
variables measuring length of subsidy spells became: average subsidy spell; share of 
families categorized as having stable spells; and share having unstable spells for the 
given state, month, and subgroups. When looking at the share of eligible children with 
stable spells, the analysis collapsed child-level observations by state and month.  
To calculate the effect of policies on subsidy receipt, OLS regressions were run 
using fixed state and time (month and year) effects. Standard errors were clustered at the 
state-level and data were weighted by cell size.  The regression is specified as follows: 
(1) !! = !!! + !!! ∗ !!,! + !!! ∗ !!,! … !+ !!! + !!! + !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Results are highly similar when two-parent families are excluded from the analysis.  
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where Si is subsidy spell length (average spell length, share stable spells, or share 
unstable spells), Pi,t is the policy of interest in state i in month t, Xi,t  are control variables, !i is fixed state effects,!!! is month-year effects, and !! is the error term. Separate 
regressions were run for each of the independent and dependent variables, for a total of 
nine regressions in the main analysis.   
 
Results 
 
Job Search Eligibility  
States that did not allow job search as a work-eligibility requirement had 
significantly longer average spell lengths and a greater proportion of families with stable 
spells. In these states, the policies were associated with a 2.1 months increase (p<0.01) in 
average spell length than states that allowed job search for all child care recipients. No 
job search eligibility was also associated with a 8.3 percentage points increase (p<0.01) 
in share of families with stable spells and 6.3 percentage point decrease (p<0.01) in share 
of families with unstable spells.  (See Table 5.) 
This finding ran counter to original hypotheses, which lead me to consider 
whether more stable families were receiving the subsidy in states that were not allowing 
job search as a work eligibility activity. In the main analysis, the share of stable spells is 
measured as a proportion of children receiving the subsidy. To test this new hypothesis, I 
used the share of stable spells based on the number of children in the state who were 
eligible for the subsidy.   
When looking at the effect of policies based on the share of eligible children with 
stable spells, there is a negative relationship between policies that do not allow job search 
as work eligibility activity and the share of children with stable spells. On average,  
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1.4 percent of children who were eligible for the subsidy had stable spells. A policy that 
disallowed job search as a work eligibility activity was associated with 0.16 percentage 
point decrease (p<0.01) in share of eligible children with a stable spell, or a more than 10 
percent decrease in eligible children with a stable spell (See Table 5). This may confirm 
the hypothesis that states that do not allow job search to count towards eligibility may on 
average be serving a more stable population. Therefore, the relationship between the 
policies and spell length cannot be accurately captured only looking at current subsidy 
recipients. However, when looking at the total eligible population there appears to be a 
significant negative effect.  
When a sub-analysis is conducted looking at TANF recipients, there is a negative 
relationship between policies that do not allow job search as a work eligibility activity 
and length and stability of subsidy spells. (See Table 6.) This policy is associated with 0.9 
month decline in average spell length for TANF recipients (p<0.01). The average spell 
length for TANF recipients was 16.9 months, meaning the policy had a 5.3 percent 
negative effect on spell length. As was noted above, states where job search eligibility is 
not allowed may be serving a more stable population that does not face the same levels of 
high unemployment or job turnover. In this sense, the TANF population may be a better 
indicator of the receipt for less stable populations. TANF families, on average, have 
lower household incomes than other recipients of the child care subsidy. The median 
monthly household income for TANF ($896.31) recipients was 40 percent lower than the 
median income of the entire study population ($1458.91). For non-TANF recipients the 
median monthly household income was $1546.29. As a result of limited resources, TANF 
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recipients may find it difficult to pay child care copays and may face more day-to-day 
challenges in making ends meet which may impact stability of child care.  
 
Redetermination Period 
The length of the redetermination period did have a significant impact on average 
spell length and share of families with either stable or unstable spells. A one-month 
increase in the redetermination period was associated with a 0.4 month decrease in 
average spell length (p<0.05). Based on these estimates, a 12-month redetermination 
period would be associated with a decrease of 5.2 months in average spell length. The 
relationship of redetermination periods runs counter to initial notions of the impact it may 
have on families’ subsidy use. It has been proposed that shorter redetermination periods 
may create barriers as more frequent interactions may disincentivize families from 
continuing this subsidy. When a secondary analysis was conducted looking at the effect 
of the policy on the share stables spells of all eligible children, there was no significant 
relationship between the policy and share of stable spells. (See table 7).  
When focusing on the share of families with stable or unstable spells, the results 
are even more mixed. A one-month increase in the redetermination period is associated 
with a 0.56 percentage point increase in share of families with stable spells (p<0.01), or a 
3.5 percentage point increase for state’s with 12-month redetermination periods 
compared to ones with 6-month redetermination periods. The policy was also associated 
with a 0.72 percentage point increase in share of families with unstable spells (p<0.01), 
or an 4.3 percentage point increase in stable spells for a 12-month redetermination period. 
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While at first glance these two measures may run counter to one another, it may point to a 
polarization of spell lengths and other factors that might be influencing spell length.  
While more frequent redeterminations may discourage families from continuing 
their subsidies, one could also argue that frequent redeterminations may allow families to 
address unresolved issues – such as reporting requirements or issues with their 
copayments – that have prevented them from maintaining their subsidies. As is discussed 
in greater detail below, the mixed results may point to a larger issue related to the 
implementation of policies locally. (See the discussion below on local bureaucracies).  
 When isolating the TANF population, the relationship between the policy and 
average spell length becomes less significant (p<0.1) but does not change much in value 
compared to the main analysis and a sub-analysis of non-TANF recipients. (See Table 8.) 
A one-month increase in the redetermination period was associated with 0.5 month 
decrease in average spell length. A significant relationship does exist for share of stable 
and unstable spells, with a one month increase in length of time between redetermination 
associated with 1.8 percentage point decrease in stable spells (p<0.01) and a 2.0 
percentage point increase in unstable spells (p<0.01). These are relatively large effects 
given that a 12-month redetermination period was associated with a 21.6 percentage point 
decrease in stable spells and a 24 percentage point increase in unstable spells.  
 
Reporting Changes in Income  
 The analysis supported the hypothesis that families that face fewer reporting 
requirements are likely to have longer subsidy spells. In states that required families to 
report no changes in income in between redetermination periods, children were likely to 
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have subsidy spells that were 3.3 months longer (p<0.05) compared to children living in 
states where all changes in income have to be reported. (See Table 9.) Similarly, states 
with no reporting requirements around income had an estimated 9.7 percentage point 
increase in share of families with stable spells (p<0.01) and a 6.3 percentage point 
decrease in families with unstable spells (p<0.05).  
 When looking at states that require families to report only certain changes in 
income (e.g., changes greater than $200 in monthly income) the relationship is less clear. 
According to the analysis, living in a state that required certain levels of changes to be 
reported was associated with a decrease of 2.6 months in average spell length (p<0.01). 
There was no significant relationship between the policy and share of stable spells. The 
relationship between this policy and unstable spells was only significant at the 10 percent 
level, and was associated with a 2.4 percentage point decrease in unstable spells. This 
policy could be viewed as having a more limited impact as families may remain confused 
about when they have to report changes in income. Additionally, few states actually hold 
this policy. During the study period, only six states had the policy in place and two other 
states changed their policies. (It is important to note that even fewer states (N=5) allow 
families to report no changes in income.)  Finally, other factors, such as local 
implementation, may have a greater impact on subsidy spell length. 
 Policies related to reporting changes in income appear to have a greater impact on 
TANF populations. (See Table 10.) Policies that don’t require families to report changes 
in income were associated with a 6.9 month increase in average spell length (p<0.01) for 
TANF recipients, compared to a 2.4 month increase in spell length (p<0.1) for non-
TANF recipients. The effect of policies that require families to report some changes in  
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 income also differed between TANF recipients and children not receiving TANF. In the 
main analysis, there was a negative relationship between this policy and average spell 
length. However, when looking at TANF recipients the relationship becomes positive for 
average spell length and share of stable spells. The policy was associated with a 2.0 
month increase in average spell length (p<0.01) and a 10 percentage point increase in 
share of stable spells (p<0.01). For non-TANF recipients, the policy is associated with a 
3.1 decrease in average spell length (p<0.01), but the relationship between share of stable 
and unstable spells is no longer significant.  
 TANF recipients may be more sensitive to policies that will require more frequent 
interactions with the subsidy agency. To report household changes, such as income or 
household size, families typically must call or visit the agency and complete necessary 
paperwork. These additional barriers may be particularly challenging for TANF families, 
who have fewer financial resources. 
 Similar to the TANF population, there is a significant positive relationship 
between share of eligible children with stables spells and policies that only require 
families to report some changes or no changes in income. In states that required families 
to only report changes in income over a certain amount, the policy was associated with a 
0.4 percentage point increase (p<0.01) in share of spells longer than 12 months, or an 
almost 30 percent increase in the share of eligible children with stable spells. The effect 
was even larger when looking at states that don’t require families to report changes in 
income in between redetermination periods. The policy was associated with 0.63 
percentage point increase in share of stable spells, or a 45 percent increase in eligible 
children with spells longer than 12 months.  
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Interaction of policies 
 The analysis also looked at the effect of the policies together on maintenance of 
spells.  As noted above and summarized in Table 2, states have implemented these 
policies in a number of different ways and combinations. A state that had less restrictive 
policies (i.e., allowed job search, required families to only report some or no changes in 
income, and a 12-month redetermination period) was associated with a 2.3 percentage 
point increase (p<0.01) in share of eligible children with spells longer than 12 months. 
(See Table 11.) This is relatively large effect given that the average share of eligible 
children with spells was 1.6 percent.  
 Policies related to reporting changes in income appear to have the largest effect 
on stability of spells. In states that had longer redetermination periods and only required 
families to report some or no changes but did not allow job search, the policies were 
associated with a 2.2 percentage point increase (p<0.01) in share of eligible children with 
stable spells. In states that allowed job search and had less restrictive requirements 
around reporting changes in income but had 6-month redetermination periods, the 
policies were associated with a 0.9 percentage point increase (p<0.01) in share of eligible 
children with spells longer than 12 months.  
 The effects of less restrictive redetermination periods and job search eligibility 
have a smaller effect on stability of spells compared to reporting changes in income. A 
combination of policies that require families to report all changes in but had longer 
redetermination periods and allowed job search were associated with only 0.4 percentage 
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point increase in share of stable spells. The interaction between 12-month 
redetermination periods and job search for all is not significant.  
 These results should be interpreted with caution as relatively few states had a 
combination of less restrictive policies in place during the study. For example, only two 
states (Louisiana and Maine) had the combination of all three less restrictive policies and 
only three states (Kansas, Louisiana, and Michigan) had less restrictive reporting 
requirements around changes in income, 12-month redetermination periods, and did not 
allow job search eligible at some point during the study period. Other factors in these 
states – particularly in Louisiana, which changed its policies around job search during the 
study – may be impacting the length of subsidy spells.  
 
Discussion 
The analysis indicates that subsidy polices may have some effect on families’ 
maintenance of child care subsidies but the story may be more complicated than 
originally hypothesized. When analyzing the impact of policies related to job search as a 
work eligibility activity, policies that did not allow job search to count as an eligibility 
activity were associated with an increase in the average length and stability of spells. At 
first glance this runs counter to initial hypotheses that more lenient eligibility 
requirements may give families greater flexibility and allow them to maintain subsidies 
for longer. However, when the analysis is re-run looking at the TANF population and the 
share of eligible children with stable spells, the policy is associated with a decrease in 
average spell length. I extended my analysis to hypothesize that states do not allow job 
search may be serving a more stable population. As a result, the only looking at a share of 
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observed spells may not adequately capture the effect of the policy on subsidy 
maintenance.  
The effects of redetermination policies were also mixed, with the policy 
associated with both an increase in the share of stable spells and unstable spells. Previous 
research has shown that families are at increased risk of ending their subsidy spells 
around the time of their redetermination. The policy may have a limited effect on families 
only around the time of their redetermination, an effect that the current dataset is not able 
to capture.  
Requirements around reporting changes in income also had a significant effect on 
spell length and stability. In particular, there was a positive association between policies 
that don’t require families to report changes in income and average spell length and share 
of children with stable spells. This supports the hypothesis that more frequent interaction 
with child care agency may create barriers for families in maintaining their subsidies. 
 Most notable in this analysis is the different effect that policies may have on the 
TANF population, in particular. Since welfare was reformed nearly two decades ago, 
there has been a significant decline in the number of recipients and the size of benefits. 
Some policymakers and researchers have expressed concerns that those left on the rolls 
may be more vulnerable and even more lacking in resources. As can be seen in the 
analysis, requirements related to eligibility based on job search and reporting 
requirements around income have a significant relationship with how long TANF 
families maintain their subsidies. In particular, in states that allowed job search to count 
as a work eligibility requirement or did not require changes in income to be reported, 
there was an increase in the average length and stability of spells.  
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Some scholars have expressed concerns that as TANF caseloads continue to fall, 
those still left on the rolls would be families that face significant barriers to employment 
and other risk factors for persistent poverty. However, studies show that the 
demographics of the TANF population have remained relatively the same since 1996 
welfare reform (Loprest, 2012) and that women have higher earnings under the TANF 
program and face fewer material hardships. However, many TANF recipients still report 
facing some hardships, such as food insecurity, and struggle to make ends meet 
(Danziger, Corcoran, Danziger, & Heflin, 2000). In this study, the TANF population’s 
average monthly income was less than half the size of the non-TANF population’s 
income. Special attention may be warranted to how policies affect the TANF population 
and those transitioning off of welfare.  
This study has several limitations that may impact the generalizability of results 
and prevent one from drawing causal conclusions. One of the main limitations is the 
assumption that caseworkers are implementing policies according to the state regulations. 
A great deal of literature has analyzed how local implementation can vary significantly 
from federal or state-level policies for a variety of local factors, including caseworkers’ 
preferences, caseworkers’ coping mechanisms for dealing with large caseloads, and local 
culture and office politics (Lipsky, 2010). All of these factors may alter how policies take 
place and the experiences that families have with the program. For example, a 
caseworker could continue a family’s subsidy even if the parent has been laid off and the 
state does not allow job search as an eligibility activity. Or, a family may decide to end 
its subsidy because of a poor interaction with the subsidy agency, despite living in a state 
with relatively lenient policies.    
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Another limitation to this study is that it looks at average spell length in a given 
month, but does not measure when a family leaves the program. With a dataset that tracks 
families over time, researchers could analyze the timeframe in which people leave the 
program in relation to the policy and the actual length of family’s spells. The study also 
draws on administrative data, which can be a particularly rich source of information since 
it may be more reliable than self-reported survey data and contains details of family 
eligibility and subsidy levels (Ha & Meyer, 2010, p. 348; Johnson et al., 2011, p. 1081). 
However, with any administrative data set one must be concerned about the quality of the 
data and whether caseworkers inputted data properly.  
The study also takes a macro-level view and may not capture informal practices 
that localities may have to help families maintain subsidies, such as increased outreach to 
families who are at risk of losing the subsidy or have fallen off the books. The study 
assumes that if these practices exist they are constant over time. The model also looks at 
policies broadly and does not capture more specific details about policies. For example, 
some states have shorter time limits on how long families can count job search as a work 
eligibility requirement. Additionally, while the study attempts to control for the 
interaction of the three policies with one another, child care subsidy programs have a host 
of other policies that may also have an impact on subsidy length, such as the size of 
subsidies and the types of care that families can use subsidies for. Finally, the study was 
limited to a four-year period given the available dataset.  
The introduction of the policies database offers researchers the opportunity to 
better understand the effects of policies on families. With more extensive administrative 
datasets, researchers could follow families over time to better understand when they leave 
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the program and if and when they continue receiving subsidies. This will help 
policymakers better understand how policies affect the length of subsidy spells and 
whether the policies result in short or permanent breaks in subsidy usage.  
Studying the effect of policies continues to be an important area of consideration, 
given that states continue to develop divergent policies with limited understanding of the 
impact that these policies may have on recipients. States are in a challenging position to 
craft policies that allow them to provide appropriate levels of subsidies while also serving 
families in need of subsidized child care. Studies such as this analysis offer an 
opportunity to identify policies that are the most restrictive and may have the greatest 
impact on subsidy length and to consider how these policies may be better shaped to 
serve families. Finally, additional attention may be warranted to TANF populations and 
those transitioning off welfare. As the analysis showed, the length of spells for the TANF 
population is strongly related to the types of policies that states implement. Better 
understanding this relationship may help states to be tailor policies to support this highly 
at-risk population.  
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Chart 1. Distribution of Average Spell Lengths
Table 2. Breakdown of state policies across all three policies by 
state and month.   
Job Search Policy and 
Redetermination Policy 
(months) 
Reporting Changes in Income Policy 
All 
Changes 
Some 
Changes 
No 
Changes 
Other 
Policy Job Search for all  
  6 months 292 36 3 31 
  12 months 241 16 0 9 
 Job Search for Continuing 
   6 months 322 37 120 0 
  12 months 127 12 0 0 
 No Job Search 
   6 months 134 11 0 51 
  12 months 118 90 0 19 
The number represents the number of states by month that had the three policies in 
place 
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  Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Child-level observations 
    
Mean/ 
Frequency 
Std. 
Dev.  N 
Weighted  
N 
Child's Age (months) 60.6 37.3  724,801   5,466,708  
      Monthly Household Income $1,496.47 $986.95  724,612   5,464,670  
      Household size 3.7 1.4  724,801   5,466,708  
      Single-Parent Headed Households (yes = 1)  89.5% 0.31  724,801   5,466,708  
      TANF Recipients 18.1% 0.38  724,801   5,466,708  
      Length of Spell (months) 25.0 29.2  724,801   5,466,708  
      Race/Ethnicity of Child 
    
 
Hispanic 19.7% 0.40  716,914   5,411,403  
 
Black 47.9% 0.50  710,353   5,372,511  
 
White 45.2% 0.50  710,492   5,372,800  
 
Asian 1.4% 0.12  710,334   5,372,472  
 
Native American 1.5% 0.12  710,335   5,372,474  
  Pacific Islander 1.5% 0.12  710,334   5,372,472  
Table*4:*Average*Spell*Length*by*Age*Group 
Age Group N 
% of all 
children  
Spell Length 
(months) 
  Mean SD 
Infants (0-23 months) 162,532 18.1% 
 
14.7 22.0 
Two-Year Olds (24-35 months) 120,653 13.5% 
 
18.0 22.3 
Three-Year Olds (36-47 months) 62,414 7.0% 
 
19.7 23.1 
Four-Year Olds (48-59 months) 173,879 19.4% 
 
22.3 24.3 
Five years and older (60+ months) 376,448 42.0%   33.0 33.5 
All Children 895,926 100.0%   25.0 29.1 
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Table 5: OLS Regression results for impact of policies related to job 
search eligibility 
 
Share of eligible 
children with 
spells of more 
than 12 months 
Share of 
children with 
spells of more 
than 12 
months 
Share of 
children with 
spells of less 
than 6 months 
Average 
Spell 
(months) 
Job Search        
!!For continuing eligible -0.04% -5.24% 4.06% -2.123 ! (0.002) (0.041) (0.045) (1.627) !No Job Search allowed -0.16% *** 8.27% ** -6.35% *** 2.088 *** ! (0.001) (0.033) (0.011) (0.460) ! ! ! !Child Age   ! ! ! ! ! !!24-35 months   13.00% *** -7.96% *** 2.599 *** ! !   (0.009) (0.007) (0.386) !36-47 months   15.70% *** -8.66% *** 3.928 *** ! !   (0.016) (0.009) (0.756) !48-59 months   19.20% *** -11.20% *** 5.944 *** ! !   (0.014) (0.008) (0.899) !60 months and older   26.30% *** -13.80% *** 14.82 *** ! !   (0.012) (0.007) (1.658) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! !Household Income (monthly)   0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.000796 ! !   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) ! ! ! !Single-Parent Headed Household (Yes = 1 )   12.40% *** -7.04% *** 8.062 *** ! !   (0.013) (0.008) (1.623) ! ! ! !TANF Recipient (yes = 1)    -12.60% *** 8.87% *** -5.595 *** ! !   (0.033) (0.023) (1.548) ! ! ! !Household Size   2.90% *** -1.42% *** 3.222 *** ! !   (0.004) (0.003) (0.779) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! !Intercept 1.54% *** 26.60% *** 39.60% *** 7.959 ** ! ! (0.001) (0.054) (0.053) (3.747) ! ! ! !Observations 1,669 4,556,206 4,556,206 4,556,206 
R-squared 0.884 0.492 0.319 0.592 
State and year indicator variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-
level) are provided in parentheses. Job Search eligibility for continuing and newly eligible and infants are 
contained in the intercept.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
! ! 
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Table 6: Subgroup Analysis: TANF v. Non-TANF OLS Regression results for impact of 
policies related to job search eligibility 
    TANF Recipients   Non-TANF Recipients 
 
Stable Spells 
(Share of 
children) 
Unstable 
Spells (share 
of children) 
Average 
Spell 
(months) ! Stable Spells (Share of children) Unstable Spells (share of children) Average Spell (months) Job Search       ! ! ! ! ! ! !! For continuing eligible -6.40% 2.89% -2.1 ! -4.80% 4.16% -1.934 ! (0.059) (0.055) (1.755) ! (0.037) (0.042) (1.520) ! No Job Search allowed -2.44% ** 1.42% -0.904 *** ! 11.00% ** -8.41% *** 3.008 *** ! (0.011) (0.025) (0.327) ! (0.052) (0.018) (0.986) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Child Age ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! 24-35 months 9.75% *** -8.20% *** 2.237 *** ! 14.00% *** -7.91% *** 2.831 *** ! ! (0.012) (0.009) (0.409) ! (0.009) (0.009) (0.434) ! 36-47 months 11.40% *** -8.54% *** 2.895 *** ! 17.00% *** -8.67% *** 4.354 *** ! ! (0.017) (0.010) (0.588) ! (0.016) (0.010) (0.851) ! 48-59 months 14.30% *** -10.10% *** 4.504 *** ! 20.50% *** -11.40% *** 6.438 *** ! ! (0.016) (0.010) (0.744) ! (0.015) (0.009) (0.998) ! 60 months and older 18.50% *** -11.80% *** 9.643 *** ! 28.20% *** -14.20% *** 16.02 *** ! ! (0.017) (0.010) (2.282) ! (0.011) (0.008) (1.659) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Household Income (monthly) 0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.0015 *** ! 0.00% ** 0.00% *** 0.000312 ! ! (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ! (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Single-Parent Headed Household (Yes = 1 ) 6.84% *** -2.62% 4.187 *** ! 12.90% *** -7.46% *** 8.517 *** ! ! (0.026) (0.017) (1.307) ! (0.014) (0.009) (1.733) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Household Size 1.70% *** -0.50% 2.036 ** ! 3.37% *** -1.75% *** 3.603 *** ! ! (0.005) (0.003) (0.996) ! (0.004) (0.002) (0.815) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Intercept 13.10% * 54.10% *** 0.903 ! 10.70% ** 46.20% *** -8.636 ! ! (0.071) (0.062) (4.889) ! (0.046) (0.048) (6.538) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! ! !Observations 799,379 799,379 799,379  ! 3,756,827 3,756,827 3,756,827 R-squared 0.445 0.242 0.566     0.491 0.325 0.603 
State and year indicator variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) are provided in 
parentheses. Job Search eligibility for continuing and newly eligible and infants are contained in the intercept.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    ! ! ! ! ! ! !
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TABLE*7:*OLS*Regression*results*for*impact*of*policies*related*to*
length*of*redetermination*period 
 
Share!of!eligible!children!with!spells!of!more!than!12!months 
Share!of!children!with!spells!of!more!than!12!months 
Share!of!children!with!spells!of!less!than!6!months Average!Spell!(months) Redetermination!Period!(months) 0.04% 0.56% ** 0.72% *** 50.437 *** ! ! (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.145)     ! ! ! !Child!Age   ! ! ! ! ! !! 24535!months   13.20% *** 58.38% *** 2.657 *** ! !   (0.009) (0.007) (0.416) ! 36547!months   15.80% *** 58.98% *** 3.886 *** ! !   (0.017) (0.009) (0.812) ! 48559!months   19.10% *** 511.50% *** 5.9 *** ! !   (0.015) (0.007) (0.960) ! 60!months!and!older   26.30% *** 514.20% *** 15.02 *** ! !   (0.013) (0.006) (1.777) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! !Household!Income!(monthly)   0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.000926 ! !   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)   ! ! ! !Single5Parent!Headed!Household!(Yes!=!1!)   12.50% *** 57.36% *** 8.34 *** ! !   (0.014) (0.008) (1.723)   ! ! ! !TANF!Recipient!(yes!=!1)!   512.60% *** 8.83% *** 55.564 *** ! !   (0.034) (0.023) (1.570)   ! ! ! !Household!Size   2.74% *** 51.35% *** 3.248 *** ! !   (0.004) (0.003) (0.829) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! !Intercept 1.13% *** 5.13% 46.10% *** 56.086 ! ! (0.002) (0.037) (0.019) (6.606) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! !Observations 1,669 4,251,586 4,251,586 4,251,586 R5squared  0.884 0.501 0.326 0.595 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!State!and!year!indicator!variables!are!also!included!in!the!model.!Robust!standard!errors!(clustered!at!the!state5level)!are!provided!in!parentheses.!Infants!are!contained!in!the!intercept.! ***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!*!p<0.1  
! !   
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Table 8. Subgroup Analysis: TANF v. Non-TANF OLS Regression results for  impact of 
policies related to length of redetermination period 
  TANF Recipients   Non-TANF Recipients 
 
Stable Spells 
(Share of 
children) 
Unstable 
Spells (share 
of children) 
Average Spell 
(months) ! Stable Spells (Share of children) Unstable Spells (share of children) Average Spell (months) Redetermination Period (months) -1.81% *** 2.03% *** -0.499 * ! 0.65% *** 0.65% *** -0.498 *** ! ! (0.005) (0.003) (0.264) ! (0.002) (0.001) (0.110) ! ! !! ! !! !! !!Child Age !! !! !! ! !! !! !!! 24-35 months 9.74% *** -8.30% *** 2.231 *** ! 14.30% *** -8.41% *** 2.928 *** ! ! (0.012) (0.009) (0.417) ! (0.009) (0.008) (0.465) ! 36-47 months 11.40% *** -8.65% *** 2.912 *** ! 17.10% *** -9.05% *** 4.338 *** ! ! (0.017) (0.010) (0.602) ! (0.018) (0.010) (0.926) ! 48-59 months 14.30% *** -10.20% *** 4.508 *** ! 20.40% *** -11.80% *** 6.429 *** ! ! (0.016) (0.010) (0.755) ! (0.016) (0.008) (1.080) ! 60 months and older 18.60% *** -11.90% *** 9.715 *** ! 28.30% *** -14.70% *** 16.32 *** ! ! (0.018) (0.010) (2.327) ! (0.012) (0.006) (1.781) ! ! !! !! !! ! !! !! !!Household Income (monthly) 0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.00152 *** ! 0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.000477 ! ! (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ! (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) ! ! !! ! !! !! !!Single-Parent Headed Household (Yes = 1 ) 6.91% ** -2.77% 4.204 *** ! 13.10% *** -7.87% *** 8.895 *** ! ! (0.026) (0.017) (1.329) ! (0.015) (0.009) (1.842) ! ! !! !! !! ! !! !! !!Household Size 1.71% *** -0.50% 2.057 ** ! 3.19% *** -1.67% *** 3.653 *** ! ! (0.005) (0.003) (1.009) ! (0.004) (0.002) (0.877) ! ! !! ! !! !! !!Intercept 17.40% *** 45.20% *** 1.676 ! 2.04% 47.40% *** -8.518 ! ! (0.054) (0.037) (6.165) ! (0.032) (0.018) (6.792) ! ! !! !! !! ! !! !! !!Observations 785,987 785,987 785,987 ! 3,465,599 3,465,599 3,465,599 R-squared 0.447 0.243 0.567   0.501 0.337 0.607 
State and year indicator variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) are provided in parentheses. 
Infants are contained in the intercept.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    ! !! !! !! 
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Table 9. OLS Regression results for impact of policies related to 
reporting change in income 
  
Share of eligible 
children with 
spells of more 
than 12 months 
Share of 
children with 
spells of more 
than 12 months 
Share of 
children with 
spells of less 
than 6 months 
Average Spell 
(months) 
Reporting Change in Income   ! ! ! ! ! ! Report Some Changes 0.41% *** 0.66%  -2.39% * -2.404 *** ! ! (0.001) (0.021) (0.013) (0.734) ! Report No Changes 0.63% *** 9.81% *** -6.37% ** 3.313 ! ! (0.001) (0.025) (0.028) (1.626) ! Other Policy -0.03% -0.92% 0.17% -1.124 ! ! (0.001) (0.019) (0.011) (1.033) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! Child Age ! ! ! ! ! ! !!! 24-35 months   13.00% *** -7.96% *** 2.599 *** ! !   (0.009) (0.007) (0.386) ! 36-47 months   15.70% *** -8.66% *** 3.931 *** ! !   (0.016) (0.009) (0.757) ! 48-59 months   19.20% *** -11.20% *** 5.945 *** ! !   (0.014) (0.008) (0.899) ! 60 months and older  26.30% *** -13.80% *** 14.82 *** ! !   (0.012) (0.007) (1.658) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! Household Income (monthly)   0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.000808 ! !   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! Single-Parent Headed Household (Yes = 1 )   12.40% *** -7.07% *** 8.072 *** ! !   (0.013) (0.008) (1.624) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! TANF Recipient (yes = 1)    -12.60% *** 8.85% *** -5.586 *** ! !   (0.033) (0.023) (1.548) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! Househould Size   2.90% *** -1.42% *** 3.221 *** ! !   (0.004) (0.003) (0.779) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! Intercept 1.21% *** -1.66% 56.20% *** -11.48 * ! ! (0.001) (0.042) (0.029) (6.441) ! !   ! ! ! ! ! Observations 1,669 4,556,206 4,556,206 4,556,206 
R-squared 0.885 0.491 0.319 0.591 
           State!and!year!indicator!variables!are!also!included!in!the!model.!Robust!standard!errors!(clustered!at!the!state5level)!are!provided!in!parentheses.!Recipients!who!have!to!report!all!changes!in!income!and!Infants!are!contained!in!the!intercept.!!***!p<0.01,!**!p<0.05,!*!p<0.1! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  
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Table 10: Subgroup Analysis: TANF v. Non-TANF OLS Regression results for impact of policies 
related to reporting change in income 
 TANF Recipients !! Non-TANF Recipients 
 
Stable Spells 
(Share of 
children) 
Unstable Spells 
(share of 
children) 
Average Spell 
(months) ! Stable Spells (Share of children) Unstable Spells (share of children) Average Spell (months) Reporting Change in Income ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! Report Some Changes 10.10% *** -5.01% ** 2.013 *** ! -0.43% -1.84% -3.108 *** ! ! (0.021) (0.019) (0.694) ! (0.023) (0.013) (0.793) ! Report No Changes 10.10% *** -0.61% 6.58 *** ! 9.47% *** -7.53% ** 2.384 ! ! (0.029) (0.021) (2.292) ! (0.028) (0.033) (1.531) ! Other Policy -0.31% -0.27% 0.761 ! -1.09% 0.53% -1.581 ! ! (0.024) (0.019) (1.192) ! (0.022) (0.011) (0.990) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Child Age ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! 24-35 months 0.0975 *** -8.20% *** 2.237 *** ! 14.00% *** -7.91% *** 2.831 *** ! ! (0.012) (0.009) (0.411) ! (0.009) (0.009) (0.434) ! 36-47 months 11.40% *** -8.53% *** 2.893 *** ! 17.00% *** -8.67% *** 4.358 *** ! ! (0.017) (0.010) (0.588) ! (0.016) (0.010) (0.852) ! 48-59 months 14.30% *** -10.10% *** 4.505 *** ! 20.50% *** -11.40% *** 6.438 *** ! ! (0.016) (0.010) (0.744) ! (0.015) (0.009) (0.998) ! 60 months and older 18.50% *** -11.80% *** 9.641 *** ! 28.20% *** -14.20% *** 16.01 *** ! ! (0.017) (0.010) (2.282) ! (0.011) (0.008) (1.659) ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Household Income (monthly) 0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.00149 *** ! 0.00% ** 0.00% *** 0.000334 ! ! (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ! (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Single-Parent Headed Household (Yes = 1 ) 6.85% *** -2.62% 4.189 *** ! 12.90% *** -7.51% *** 8.534 *** ! ! (0.026) (0.017) (1.305) ! (0.014) (0.009) (1.734) ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Household size 1.71% *** -0.50% 2.038 ** ! 3.36% *** -1.74% *** 3.6 *** ! ! (0.005) (0.003) (0.996) ! (0.004) (0.002) (0.815) ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Intercept -3.46% 57.60% *** -7.631 ! -3.74% 58.00% *** -13.08 ** ! ! (0.061) (0.042) (6.647) ! (0.039) (0.029) (6.416) ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !Observations 799,379 799,379 799,379 ! 3,756,827 3,756,827 3,756,827 R-squared 0.445 0.242 0.567  0.49 0.324 0.603 State and year indicator variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) are provided in 
parentheses. Recipients who have to report all changes in income and Infants are contained in the intercept.  
! ! !*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    ! ! ! ! ! ! !
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Table 11: OLS Regression results for the interaction of the three policies on maintenance of subsidy spells 
  
Total Population   TANF   Non-TANF 
 
  
Share of eligible 
children with 
spells of more 
than 12 months 
  
Share of children 
with spells of more 
than 12 months 
Share of children 
with spells of less 
than 6 months 
Average Spell 
(months) 
  
Share of children 
with spells of more 
than 12 months 
Share of 
children with 
spells of less 
than 6 months 
Average Spell 
(months) 
  
Share of 
children with 
spells of more 
than 12 months 
Share of 
children with 
spells of less 
than 6 months 
Average Spell 
(months) 
  
            
 
                        
  
    
Job Search (1= Job Search Allowed) 0.23% *** 
 
-15.00% *** 8.33% *** -2.951 *** 
 
0.0145 0.0135 1.067 
 
-22.80% *** 12.30% *** -5.440 *** 
  
(0.000628) 
 
(0.0176) (0.00878) (1.060) 
 
(0.0199) (0.0133) (1.300) 
 
(0.0164) (0.00717) (0.958) 
Reporting Changes in Income (1= Do 
not report all changes in income)  1.17% *** 
 
-5.81% ** 2.93% ** -2.369 
 
7.82% * -7.26% *** 5.550 
 
-14.10% *** 6.89% *** -6.167 *** 
  
(0.00101) 
 
(0.0271) (0.0136) (2.279) 
 
(0.0412) (0.0254) (3.495) 
 
(0.0237) -0.0114 (1.972) 
Redeterm. Period (1= 12-month 
redeterm. period) 0.36% *** 
 
-7.15% ** 3.57% * 1.195 
 
8.19% ** -0.0246 7.673 *** 
 
-14.20% *** 6.59% *** -1.682 
  
(0.00104) 
 
(0.0307) (0.0182) (1.854) 
 
(0.0354) (0.0270) (2.348) 
 
(0.0289) (0.0159) (1.844) 
                         Interactions 
                       
 
Job Search Allowed x Do not 
report all changes in income) -0.53% *** 
 
13.70% *** -6.29% *** 4.919 *** 
 
0.0211 7.55% *** 1.172 
 
21.20% *** -10.90% *** 7.505 *** 
  
(0.000443) 
 
(0.0121) (0.00613) (0.902) 
 
(0.0148) (0.00951) (1.135) 
 
(0.0122) (0.00615) (1.043) 
 
Job Search Allowed x 12-month 
redeterm. Period -0.09% 
  
10.40% *** 0.00803 -3.851 *** 
 
-19.00% *** 14.70% *** -10.520 *** 
 
18.00% *** -2.65% ** -1.379 
  
(0.00172) 
 
(0.0278) (0.0154) (1.262) 
 
(0.0368) (0.0274) (1.126) 
 
(0.0241) (0.0131) (1.504) 
 
Do not report all changes in 
income) x 12-month redeterm. 0.68% *** 
 
36.00% *** -18.50% *** 36.200 *** 
 
38.20% *** -17.40% *** 38.170 *** 
 
36.10% *** -17.50% *** 34.800 *** 
  
(0.00084) 
 
(0.0235) (0.0125) (2.096) 
 
(0.0409) (0.0255) (4.086) 
 
(0.0214) (0.0121) (1.633) 
 
Job Search Allowed x Do not 
report all changes in income) x 
12-month redeterm. Period 0.44% *** 
 
-12.00% *** 0.0164 0.773 
 
19.50% *** -29.80% *** 8.873 *** 
 
-19.90% *** 7.16% *** -1.852 
  
(0.00155) 
 
(0.0238) (0.0179) (1.434) 
 
(0.0339) (0.0225) (1.471) 
 
(0.0229) (0.0195) (1.577) 
                         Child Age 
                       
 
24-35 months 
   
13.10% *** -8.31% *** 2.643 *** 
 
9.59% *** -8.16% *** 2.209 *** 
 
14.30% *** -8.35% *** 2.919 *** 
     
(0.00944) (0.00673) (0.428) 
 
(0.0118) (0.00893) (0.429) 
 
(0.00915) (0.00789) (0.479) 
 
36-47 months 
   
15.70% *** -8.98% *** 3.868 *** 
 
11.30% *** -8.65% *** 2.863 *** 
 
17.10% *** -9.06% *** 4.328 *** 
     
(0.0175) (0.00902) (0.836) 
 
(0.0180) (0.0103) (0.611) 
 
(0.0181) (0.0106) (0.953) 
 
48-59 months 
   
19.10% *** -11.50% *** 5.892 *** 
 
14.30% *** -10.10% *** 4.534 *** 
 
20.50% *** -11.80% *** 6.414 *** 
     
(0.0157) (0.00753) (0.988) 
 
(0.0166) (0.0102) (0.783) 
 
(0.0169) (0.00855) (1.110) 
 
60 months and older 
   
26.40% *** -14.20% *** 15.090 *** 
 
18.40% *** -11.80% *** 9.730 *** 
 
28.40% *** -14.70% *** 16.410 *** 
     
(0.0135) (0.00622) (1.834) 
 
(0.0181) (0.0101) (2.406) 
 
(0.0124) (0.0064) 
 
(1.837) 
                         Household Income (monthly) 
   
0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.001 
 
0.00% *** 0.00% *** 0.001 *** 
 
0.00% ** 0.00% *** 0.000392 
     
(9.41e-06) (6.06e-06) (0.000582) 
 
(8.62e-06) (6.47e-06) (0.000415) 
 
(7.20e-06) (3.77e-06) (0.000589) 
                         Single-Parent Households (Yes = 1 ) 
   
12.60% *** -7.43% *** 8.530 *** 
 
7.20% *** -2.94% * 4.445 *** 
 
13.10% *** -7.88% *** 9.068 *** 
     
(0.0138) (0.00814) (1.762) 
 
(0.0261) (0.0171) (1.308) 
 
(0.0150) (0.00871) (1.886) 
                         TANF Recipient (yes = 1)  
   
-12.40% *** 8.78% *** -5.568 *** 
              
     
(0.0346) (0.0239) (1.616) 
                                       Household Size 
   
2.79% *** -1.37% *** 3.321 *** 
 
1.74% *** -0.00495 2.107 ** 
 
3.26% *** -1.72% *** 3.739 *** 
     
(0.00422) (0.00267) (0.853) 
 
(0.00505) (0.00332) (1.037) 
 
(0.00383) (0.00248) (0.901) 
                         Intercept 0.44% *** 
 
15.40% *** 45.60% *** -8.803 
 
-5.11% 55.50% *** -9.353 
 
21.50% *** 43.10% *** -7.917 
  
(0.00131) 
 
(0.0501) (0.0263) (7.353) 
 
(0.0731) (0.0482) (8.143) 
 
(0.0456) (0.0240) (7.079) 
                         Observations 1,559 
 
4,114,794 4,114,794 4,114,794 
 
758,969 758,969 758,969 
 
3,355,825 3,355,825 3,355,825 
R-squared 
  0.886   0.507 0.332 0.598 
 
0.454 0.248 0.573 
 
0.509 0.344 0.611 
State and year indicator variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) are provided in parentheses.  
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: Overview of dropped observations and missing data 
 
The administrative dataset had minimal missing data. Below I have detailed the data 
points that were dropped because they were missing: 
 
• Setting ID (56 observations) 
• Child ID (21 observations) 
• Report Date (month/year) (56 observations)  
• Start of child care subsidy (month/year) (22 observations)  
• Child date of birth (22 observations)  
• Weights (1 observation)  
• Single Parent Households (172 observations)  
• TANF recipients (2,449 observations)  
 
An additional 44,783 observations were duplicative and were dropped.  
 
Territories were also dropped from the data set:  
• American Samoa (25,220) 
• Guam (30,392) 
• Northern Mariana Islands (15,703) 
• Puerto Rico (18,005) 
• Virgin Islands (26,154) 
 
Finally, the following outliers were dropped from the data:  
• Dropped observations with family size larger than 12 (2,210 observations). I 
expect that families with more than 12 individuals may have different child care 
needs and may bias my data 
• Dropped observations where the child was 13 years or older. Under federal 
regulation, states can provide subsidies to children younger than 13 years of age 
(unless they have special needs). (2,471 observations)  
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Appendix B: Start Date of Policies by State 
State  Job Search Redetermination Reporting Income 
Illinois 2004/04/23 2005/10/01 2001/01/01 
Nebraska 2007/08/20 2007/08/20 2002/06/17 
New Jersey 2003/12/01 2003/12/01 2003/12/01 
Rhode Island 2007/09/01 2004/01/01 2004/01/01 
Alabama 2007/06/20 2007/06/20 2004/02/01 
Montana 2006/09/01 2006/09/01 2005/05/01 
Pennsylvania 2006/11/07 2005/07/01 2005/07/01 
Utah 2007/07/01 2006/08/01 2006/08/01 
Louisiana 2008/04/01 2008/09/01 2006/09/01 
New Hampshire 2006/10/01 2006/10/01 2006/10/01 
Virginia 2006/10/01 2006/10/01 2006/10/01 
Kansas 2007/01/01 2007/01/01 2007/01/01 
Indiana 2007/01/14 2007/01/14 2007/01/14 
Texas 2008/09/01 2007/01/29 2007/01/29 
Minnesota 2007/09/01 2007/04/01 2007/04/01 
Michigan 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 2007/04/01 
South Dakota 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 2007/04/01 
Colorado 2007/05/01 2007/05/01 2007/05/01 
Delaware 2007/06/01 2007/06/01 2007/06/01 
Arizona 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 
Arkansas 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 
California 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 
Tennessee 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 2007/07/01 
Washington 2007/04/10 2008/01/10 2007/07/01 
New Mexico 2007/07/16 2007/07/16 2007/07/16 
Connecticut 2007/07/18 2007/07/18 2007/07/18 
Iowa 2008/08/08 2008/08/08 2007/08/28 
Missouri 2007/09/01 2007/09/01 2007/09/01 
North Carolina 2007/09/01 2007/09/01 2007/09/01 
Florida 2007/03/04 2007/04/18 2007/10/01 
Alaska 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 
Maryland 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 
Mississippi 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 
Oregon 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 2007/10/01 
Nevada 2007/08/01 2007/08/01 2007/11/01 
Georgia 2007/11/01 2007/11/01 2007/11/01 
Massachusetts 2007/12/03 2007/07/18 2007/12/03 
Ohio 2008/07/01 2008/02/01 2008/02/01 
North Dakota 2007/09/28 2007/06/01 2008/03/01 
Hawaii 2008/03/08 2008/03/08 2008/03/08 
Idaho 2008/05/01 2008/05/01 2008/05/01 
Kentucky 2008/05/01 2008/05/01 2008/05/01 
Oklahoma 2008/06/01 2008/06/01 2008/06/01 
West Virginia 2008/07/01 2008/07/01 2008/07/01 
New York 2008/09/01 2004/03/04 2008/09/01 
Wisconsin 2008/10/29 2008/10/29 2008/10/29 
Wyoming 2009/10/01 2009/01/01 2009/01/01 
Vermont 2009/02/09 2009/02/09 2009/02/09 
South Carolina 2009/08/01 2009/08/01 2009/08/01 
DC 2007/03/01 2009/09/01 2009/09/01 
Maine 2009/10/01 2009/10/01 2009/10/01 
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Appendix C: States’ CCDF policies 
 
Length of Redetermination Period (in months)  
States whose policies change over time 
State BeginDat EndDat RedetermPeriod 
Colorado 2007/05/01 2008/07/31 6 
2011/09/01 Present 12 
Conneticut 2007/07/18 2010/12/31 6 
2011/01/01 Present 8 
Delaware 2007/06/01 2010/06/09 6 2010/06/10 Present 12 
Georgia 2007/11/01 2009/03/31 6 
2009/04/01 Present 12 
Oklahoma 2008/06/01 2011/05/08 12 2011/05/09 Present 6 
New Mexico 
2007/07/16 2010/06/29 6 
2010/06/30 Present 12 
Oregon 
2007/10/01 2009/03/31 Other 
2009/04/01 Present 6 
 
States whose policies don’t change over time 
6 months Redetermination Period 12 months Redetermination Period Other Policy 
1. Alabama 
2. Alaska 
3. Arizona 
4. Arkansas 
5. Hawaii 
6. Idaho 
7. Illinois 
8. Indiana 
9. Iowa 
10. Minnesota 
11. Mississippi 
12. Montana 
13. Nevada 
14. New Hampshire 
15. North Dakota 
16. Pennsylvania 
17. Rhode Island 
18. South Dakota 
19. Tennessee 
20. Utah 
21. Washington 
22. West Virginia 
23. Wisconsin 
24. Wyoming 
1. California 
2. District of Columbia 
3. Florida 
4. Kansas 
5. Kentucky 
6. Louisiana 
7. Maine 
8. Maryland 
9. Massachusetts 
10. Michigan 
11. Missouri 
12. Nebraska 
13. New Jersey 
14. New York 
15. North Carolina 
16. Ohio 
17. South Carolina 
18. Vermont 
19. Virginia 
 
1. Texas 
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Job Search Eligibility: If job search activities are approved for CCDF eligibility 
 
States whose policies change over time 
1=Yes, for initial and continuing eligibility; 2=Yes, only for continuing eligibility; 
3=No 
State BeginDat EndDat EligApproveActivityJobSearch 
Kentucky 2008/05/01 2011/03/31 2 2011/04/01 9999/12/31 1 
Louisiana 2008/04/01 2009/01/31 1 2010/01/01 2010/11/30 3 
Mississippi 2007/10/01 2010/09/30 2 2010/10/01 2012/01/31 1 
Missouri 2007/09/01 2010/04/27 2 2010/04/28 2012/03/14 1 
New Mexico 
2007/07/16 2009/09/30 1 
2009/10/01 2010/06/29 2 
2010/06/30 9999/12/31 1 
New York 
City 
2008/09/01 2009/06/01 1 
2009/06/02 2009/07/26 3 
2009/07/27 2011/04/30 2 
2011/05/01 9999/12/31 3 
Wyoming 2009/10/01 2010/06/30 1 
2010/07/01 2012/06/30 3 
 
States whose policies don’t change over time 
Yes, for initial and continuing 
eligibility 
Yes, only for continuing 
eligibility 
No 
2. Alaska 
3. California 
4. Colorado 
5. Delaware 
6. District of Columbia 
7. Hawaii 
8. Iowa 
9. Maryland 
10. Massachusetts 
11. Minnesota 
12. Nebraska 
13. Nevada 
14. New Hampshire 
15. New York 
16. North Carolina 
17. North Dakota 
18. Vermont 
1. Arizona 
2. Connecticut 
3. Florida 
4. Georgia 
5. Illinois 
6. Indiana 
7. Maine 
8. Montana 
9. Oklahoma 
10. Oregon 
11. Pennsylvania 
12. Rhode Island 
13. South Dakota 
14. Texas 
15. Washington 
16. West Virginia 
 
1. Alabama 
2. Arkansas 
3. Idaho 
4. Kansas 
5. Michigan 
6. New Jersey 
7. Ohio 
8. South Carolina 
9. Tennessee 
10. Utah 
11. Virginia 
12. Wisconsin 
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Reporting Change in Income: If changes in income have to be reported 
 
States whose policies change over time 
1=Yes, all changes in income; 2=Yes, only a certain amount; 3=No; 99=Other (detailed in notes) 
State BeginDat EndDat ReportIncome Notes 
Colorado 
2007/05/01 2011/08/31 1   
2011/09/01 Present 99 
Participants must report and verify changes in 
income that exceed 85 percent of the state median 
income within 10 calendar days of the change. 
Delaware 2007/06/01 2010/09/30 1   2010/10/01 Present 2   
Massachusetts 
2007/12/03 2009/12/22 1   
2009/12/23 Present 99 
A significant change, defined as a 20 percent 
increase or decrease in total household income, 
must be reported. 
New Mexico 2007/07/16 2010/06/29 1   
2010/06/30 Present 3   
North Dakota 2008/03/01 2011/09/30 1   
2011/10/01  Present 3   
Oregon 2007/10/01 2008/12/31 99 
Only changes in source of income and/or rate of 
pay must be reported. 
2009/01/01 Present 1 
 
Virginia 
2006/10/01 2009/02/28 1   
2009/03/01 Present 99 
Changes to the family's gross monthly income 
causing the total amount to exceed the income 
eligibility threshold must be reported.  Also, if a 
family no longer has income, it must be reported. 
Washington 
2007/07/01 2011/01/13 1   
2011/01/14 Present 99 
Changes in income must be reported only if the 
change would cause countable income to exceed 
the maximum eligibility limit. 
Wisconsin 
2008/10/29 2009/10/13 2 
 
2009/10/14 Present 99 
Changes must be reported if monthly income 
increases by at least 250 dollars, decreases by 100 
dollars or more, or if the increase in income will 
raise gross income above 200 percent of the 
federal poverty level. 
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States whose policies don’t change over time 
Yes, all changes Yes, only changes over 
a certain amount 
No Other 
1. Alabama 
2. Arizona 
3. Arkansas 
4. California 
5. Connecticut 
6. District of 
Columbia 
7. Florida 
8. Georgia 
9. Idaho 
10. Illinois 
11. Iowa 
12. Kentucky 
13. Maine 
14. Maryland 
15. Minnesota 
16. Mississippi 
17. Missouri 
18. Montana 
19. Nebraska 
20. Nevada 
21. New Hampshire 
22. New Jersey 
23. New York 
24. North Carolina 
25. Ohio 
26. Oklahoma 
27. South Carolina 
28. South Dakota 
29. Tennessee 
30. Texas 
31. Vermont 
32. Wyoming 
1. Alaska 
2. Kansas 
3. Louisiana 
4. Michigan 
5. Rhode Island 
 
1. Indiana 
2. Pennsylvania 
3. West Virginia 
 
1. Hawaii 
2. Utah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
